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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
Mohamed Jama Abdille, a Somali native, petitions for a 
review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA or Board) 
decision that: (1) denied him asylum from Somalia on the 
ground that he had firmly resettled in South Africa; and (2) 
denied him asylum from South Africa on the gr ound that 
he failed to establish past persecution or a well-founded 
fear of persecution in that country. Abdille's Petition for 
Review requires us to interpret for the first time the 
meaning of the "firm resettlement" bar to asylum now 
codified in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and 
further defined in S 208.15 of Title 8 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations. This statutory bar, as fleshed out in the 
applicable immigration regulations, precludes the Attorney 
General from granting asylum to an applicant when the 
Attorney General finds that the applicant had firmly 
resettled in a third country prior to his arrival in the United 
States. 
 
We conclude that the plain language of S 208.15 makes 
clear that the prime factor in the firm r esettlement inquiry 
is the existence of an offer of permanent resident status, 
citizenship, or some other type of permanent r esettlement. 
While recognizing that factors other than the issuance of 
such an offer may prove relevant to the firm resettlement 
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question, we reject an alternative "totality of the alien's 
circumstances" approach that would have us consider the 
existence of an offer as simply one component of a broader 
firm resettlement inquiry accor ding equal weight to such 
non-offer-based factors as the alien's length of stay in a 
third country, the economic and social ties that the alien 
develops in that country, and the alien's intent to make 
that country his permanent home. 
 
In light of this conclusion, we find that the BIA's 
discussion of Abdille's firm resettlement in South Africa is 
inadequate with regard to whether Abdille received an offer 
of some type of permanent resettlement, and that proper 
resolution of the firm resettlement issue requires additional 
information concerning the content of South African 
immigration law and practice. Because of the limited nature 
of the record before us on appeal, and because of the 
considerable deference we owe to the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) when it makes factual 
determinations (and the content of for eign law is a matter 
for fact finding), we will grant the Petition for Review and 
remand the case to the BIA for: (1) further investigation into 
the content of South African immigration law and practice; 
and (2) appropriate resolution of the question whether 
Abdille received an offer of some type of permanent 
resettlement from the South African gover nment. 
 
One critical element in the resolution of thefirm 
resettlement question is the determination of whether 
Abdille or the government will bear the bur den of 
establishing the content of South African law, an issue on 
which the parties disagree. To give guidance to the BIA and 
to expedite the resolution of this matter , thereby avoiding 
another Petition for Review, we address this issue and 
opine that the INS, as the party initially seeking to rely on 
foreign law, will carry the initial bur den, but that once the 
INS introduces evidence sufficient to indicate that the firm 
resettlement bar will apply, the burden of proving relevant 
provisions of South African law will shift to Abdille. Finally, 
we hold that the BIA's conclusion that Abdille failed to 
make the requisite showing of past persecution or a well- 
founded fear of persecution necessary for eligibility for 
asylum from South Africa must stand. 
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I. Facts and Procedural History1 
 
Abdille was born in Somalia in 1967, and was orphaned 
at an extremely early age. He never lear ned the identity of 
his parents and hence could not trace his clan lineage. 
According to an affidavit submitted by Said S. Samatar, 
Professor of African History at Rutgers University, clan 
lineage is a central feature of social and political life in 
Somalia, and an individual's inability to identify himself 
with a particular clan can be a substantial, per haps life- 
threatening, impediment. Such dangers wer e exacerbated 
by the fall of General Siyaad Barre in 1991, after which 
central government in Somalia collapsed, and militias, 
splintered along clan lines, filled the power vacuum. 
Clanlessness is rare in Somalia, and an individual who is 
unable to trace his lineage, such as Abdille, is often 
suspected of hiding his true affiliation and pr esumed to be 
a member of a rival clan. 
 
Prior to General Barre's fall, Abdille led an apparently 
ordinary and undisturbed existence in Somalia, employed 
as an electrician for Somali National Power in the city of 
Mogadishu. After 1991, however, events took a dramatic 
turn for the worse: Abdille lost his job, and his lack of clan 
identity led to repeated confrontations, detentions, and 
physical assaults at the hands of suspicious militia  
members.2 Ultimately, in Mar ch 1998, Abdille fled Somalia 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The basic facts concerning Abdille's life in Somalia and South Africa, 
as well as the circumstances leading up to his application for asylum in 
the United States, are not in dispute. Our r ecitation of these facts, 
particularly with regard to events in Somalia and South Africa, is drawn 
principally from Abdille's affidavit in support of his petition for 
asylum, 
and a transcript of Abdille's oral testimony befor e the Immigration Judge 
(IJ), both of which are contained in the Certified Administrative Record. 
The IJ specifically found Abdille's testimony to be credible. 
 
2. Abdille's affidavit and oral testimony depict these events in much 
greater detail. For instance, during one detention, Abdille was subjected 
to a mock execution. On another occasion, militia members tied Abdille's 
hands and feet, repeatedly beat him with sticks, and stabbed his arm 
and chest with a bayonet. As part of his application for asylum, Abdille 
submitted a report prepared by Dr . Nina Regevik, who conducted a 
physical examination of Abdille and concluded that Abdille's scars were 
consistent with a history of beatings and stabbings. 
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in a small boat, arrived in Mozambique, and then traveled 
on foot to South Africa, entering the latter country in April 
1998. We do not believe it necessary her e to canvass the 
events in Somalia in a more extensive fashion, as the 
parties do not dispute that Abdille satisfied his burden in 
establishing past persecution or a well-founded fear of 
persecution in Somalia, and that, absent application of the 
firm resettlement bar, Abdille would be eligible for asylum 
from that country. Abdille's Petition for Review focuses our 
attention on the events that transpired in South Africa. 
 
The South African government, acting pursuant to its 
Aliens Control Act of 1991, granted asylum to Abdille on or 
around June 25, 1998. Abdille's asylum documents show 
that such status had a duration of two years, commencing 
on June 25, 1998 and expiring on June 24, 2000. 
According to a letter from South Africa's Department of 
Home Affairs to Abdille, at the end of that two-year period 
Abdille would have to contact the Department for a 
"reviewal of [his] refugee status or to otherwise legalise [his] 
continued stay in" South Africa; otherwise, Abdille would be 
in the country illegally, and therefore would be subject to 
potential prosecution under the Aliens Contr ol Act. Abdille 
was also issued a South African passport, which he 
eventually used to enter the United States, and a travel 
document allowing him re-entry into South Africa. 
 
Abdille lived in Cape Town, South Africa, fr om April 1998 
through January 1999, in a rented gr oup home he shared 
with fourteen other Somali natives. Unable to obtain the 
necessary certification to pursue his previous career as an 
electrician, Abdille worked as a street vendor selling 
cigarettes, candy, and other miscellaneous items. While 
working as a street vendor, Abdille suf fered two separate 
attacks by two different groups of South Africans. First, in 
July 1998, as he was selling his merchandise in a public 
market, Abdille was approached by a group of five or six 
young South African men. The men hit Abdille, knocking 
him unconscious with a blow to the back of the head, and 
stole his merchandise. Abdille suffer ed facial injuries and 
lost several teeth. The other vendors in the market did not 
intervene. Following the attack, Abdille reported the 
incident to the police. Abdille told the officers that he could 
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identify the assailants, but he testified in pr oceedings 
before the Immigration Judge (IJ) that the police did 
nothing in response except inform him that he should 
return to the station at a later time. 
 
The second incident occurred five months later, in 
December 1998, when a separate group of men attacked 
Abdille as he was selling his wares in a dif ferent market. 
The men stole all of Abdille's merchandise, but Abdille ran 
away before he could be physically injur ed. [A.R. 131]. 
Again, Abdille reported the attack to the police, but was 
told to return the next day. Following the December attack, 
Abdille decided to leave South Africa and moved to 
Johannesburg in order to make preparations for departure. 
He remained in Johannesburg for thr ee weeks, leaving in 
February 1999. Abdille ultimately arrived in the United 
States on April 8, 1999, via Brazil and Chile. 
 
Upon his arrival, Abdille surrendered to INS officials. On 
May 19, 1999, INS issued an Order to Show Cause, 
charging Abdille with removability under 8 U.S.C. 
S 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), as an immigrant not in possession of a 
valid immigrant visa or entry document, and 8 U.S.C. 
S 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(II), as an immigrant in possession of a visa 
not properly issued. Abdille sought asylum and withholding 
of removal relief both from Somalia and from South Africa. 
The IJ denied Abdille's asylum request with r espect to 
Somalia, on the ground that he had fir mly resettled in 
South Africa, and denied his asylum request with respect to 
South Africa, on the ground that he had failed to 
demonstrate persecution or a well-founded fear of  
persecution.3 Abdille appealed, but the BIA similarly denied 
his requests for asylum from both Somalia and South 
Africa, for the reasons relied upon by the IJ. Abdille now 
brings a Petition for Review contesting the BIA's decision. 
Because Abdille's removal proceedings wer e commenced 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The IJ also denied Abdille's request for withholding of removal to 
South Africa, and granted his request for withholding of removal to 
Somalia. Abdille did not appeal the IJ's withholding of removal decisions 
to the BIA, and does not seek review of those decisions on this appeal. 
Accordingly, we need not concern ourselves with the question whether 
Abdille was eligible for withholding of removal relief. 
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after April 1, 1997, we have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 
U.S.C. S 1252(a)(1). 
 
II. General Asylum Standards 
 
The federal asylum statute confers discretion on the 
Attorney General to grant asylum to an alien applicant "if 
the Attorney General determines that such alien is a 
refugee within the meaning of section 1101(a)(42)(A)." 8 
U.S.C. S 1158(b)(1). Section 1101(a)(42)(A) defines "refugee" 
as 
 
       any person who is outside any country of such 
       person's nationality or, in the case of a person having 
       no nationality, is outside any country in which such 
       person last habitually resided, and who is unable or 
       unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to 
       avail himself or herself of the protection of, that 
       country because of persecution or a well-founded fear 
       of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, 
       membership in a particular social group, or political 
       opinion . . . . 
 
8 U.S.C. S 1101(a)(42)(A). The asylum applicant bears the 
burden of establishing that he or she falls within this 
statutory definition of "refugee." See 8 C.F.R. S 208.13(a) 
(2000); see also Balasubramanrim v. INS, 143 F.3d 157, 
161 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 
Section 1158(b)(2) lists several exceptions pr oscribing the 
Attorney General from exercising his discretion to grant 
asylum, including the exception pertinent to this appeal, 
added to the federal asylum statute by the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 
1996 (IIRIRA): Section 1158(b)(2)(A)(vi) bars the grant of 
asylum to an alien "firmly resettled in another country prior 
to arriving in the United States." 8 U.S.C. S 1158(b)(2)(A)(vi); 
see also 8 C.F.R. S 208.13(c)(1) (2000) ("For applications 
filed on or after April 1, 1997, an applicant shall not qualify 
for asylum if section . . . 208(b)(2) of the Act[8 U.S.C. 
S 1158(b)(2)] applies to the applicant.").4 
 
(Text continued on page 9) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The compulsory language of the statute and r egulations makes clear 
that a finding of firm resettlement is currently a mandatory bar to the 
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grant of asylum. However, a brief survey of the evolution of the firm 
resettlement bar reveals that this was not always the case. The concept 
of "firm resettlement" was first introduced into U.S. immigration law in 
the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, ch. 647, 62 Stat. 1009, which used 
the concept of firm resettlement in the definition of "displaced person," 
and the Refugee Relief Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-203, 67 Stat. 400, 
which expressly included the phrase "fir mly resettled" in the definition 
of 
"refugee," as a limitation on the persons eligible for such status. See 
Rosenberg v. Yee Chien Woo, 402 U.S. 49, 53-54 & n.3 (1971). When the 
Refugee Relief Act was extended in 1957, however , the "firmly resettled" 
language was dropped from the "r efugee" definition, and was not re- 
inserted in subsequent statutory revisions to U.S. refugee laws until the 
IIRIRA in 1996 codified the firm r esettlement bar. See 8 U.S.C. 
S 1158(b)(2)(A)(vi). 
 
The present firm resettlement bar re-emerged in the Supreme Court's 
1971 decision in Yee Chien Woo, a case involving a native of mainland 
China, who fled that country in 1953, arrived in the United States in 
1960, and eventually applied for an immigrant visa claiming a 
"preference" under S 203(a)(7) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 
1952, as an alien who fled a Communist country fearing persecution on 
account of race, religion, or political opinion. See 402 U.S. at 50-51, 
53. 
In the seven years prior to his arrival in the U.S., Yee Chien Woo had 
lived and worked in Hong Kong. See id. at 50. The INS used Yee Chien 
Woo's residence and work in Hong Kong as a ground for denying his 
application, but the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit determined 
that the INS's reliance on the alien's fir m resettlement was erroneous. 
See id. at 51-52. Pointing to the fact that Congress had omitted the 
phrase "firmly resettled" from statutory definitions of "refugee" after 
1957, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Y ee Chien Woo's firm 
resettlement in Hong Kong was irrelevant to the issue whether his 
immigration application should be granted underS 203(a)(7). See id. The 
Supreme Court, however, unambiguously r ejected the Ninth Circuit's 
approach: "In short, we hold that the `r esettlement' concept is not 
irrelevant. It is one of the factors which the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service must take into account to determine whether a 
refugee seeks asylum in this country as a consequence of his flight to 
avoid persecution." Id. at 56. 
 
As the quoted language above demonstrates, following Yee Chien Woo, 
"firm resettlement" was not a mandatory bar to asylum eligibility, but 
rather one of the factors the INS was to weigh in exercising its 
discretion 
as to the grant of an alien's asylum application. See, e.g., Farbakhsh v. 
INS, 20 F.3d 877, 881 (8th Cir. 1994) (canvassing briefly the history of 
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"Firm resettlement," "persecution," and "well-founded fear 
of persecution" are all findings of fact that we review under 
the deferential substantial evidence standar d articulated in 
INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992)."Substantial 
evidence is more than a mere scintilla and is such relevant 
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 
support a conclusion." Senathirajah v. INS , 157 F.3d 210, 
216 (3d Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). Under the substantial evidence standar d, the 
BIA's finding must be upheld unless the evidence not only 
supports a contrary conclusion, but compels it. See Elias- 
Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 481 & n.1; Chang v. INS, 119 F.3d 
1055, 1060 (3d Cir. 1997) ("On questions of fact, we will 
reverse the BIA's determination that[an applicant] is not 
eligible for asylum . . . only if a reasonable fact-finder would 
have to conclude that the requisite fear of persecution 
existed.") (emphasis added). 
 
III. The Firm Resettlement Inquiry 
 
The BIA denied Abdille asylum from Somalia based on a 
finding of firm resettlement in South Africa. As mentioned 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
the firm resettlement bar). Prior to 1990, INS regulations prohibited 
district directors from granting asylum to aliens who had firmly resettled 
in a third country, see 8 C.F.R.S 208.8(f)(1)(ii) (1988), but the BIA 
interpreted that regulation as not applying either to immigration judges 
or to the Board itself. See Matter of Soleimani, 20 I. & N. Dec. 99, 104 
(BIA 1989). Accordingly, for immigration judges and the BIA, firm 
resettlement was a factor used to guide their discretion in determining 
whether to grant asylum. See 3 Charles Gor don et al., Immigration Law 
& Procedure S 33.04[1][e][iii], at 33-52.9 (2000). The BIA did, however, 
also rule that firm resettlement would ordinarily preclude an asylum 
grant unless the alien could demonstrate compelling countervailing 
equities in his or her favor. See Soleimani, 20 I. & N. at 105. 
 
Effective October 1, 1990, the INS amended its regulations concerning 
firm resettlement, providing for a mandatory denial of asylum upon a 
finding of firm resettlement. See 8 C.F.R. S 208.14(c)(2) (1991);see also 
8 C.F.R. S 202.13(c)(2)(i)(B) (2000) (stating that for asylum applications 
filed before April 1, 1997, an immigration or asylum officer shall not 
grant asylum to any alien who "[h]as beenfirmly resettled."). As noted 
above, Congress in 1996 codified this mandatory bar in the federal 
asylum statute at 8 U.S.C. S 1158(b)(2)(A)(vi). 
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above, the firm resettlement bar applicable in Abdille's case 
is codified in the INA at 8 U.S.C. S 1158(b)(2)(A)(vi), and 
referenced in the INS's regulations at 8 C.F.R. S 208.13(c)(1).5 
The INA does not furnish a definition of"firm resettlement," 
but federal regulations do, and that definition becomes vital 
to our analysis in the instant matter. Specifically, 8 C.F.R. 
S 208.15, captioned "Definition of `firm resettlement,' " 
provides the following: 
 
        An alien is considered to be firmly resettled if, prior 
       to arrival in the United States, he or she enter ed into 
       another nation with, or while in that nation r eceived, 
       an offer of permanent resident status, citizenship, or 
       some other type of permanent resettlement unless he or 
       she establishes: 
 
        (a) That his or her entry into that nation was a 
       necessary consequence of his or her flight fr om 
       persecution, that he or she remained in that nation 
       only as long as was necessary to arrange onwar d 
       travel, and that he or she did not establish significant 
       ties in that nation; or 
 
        (b) That the conditions of his or her residence in that 
       nation were so substantially and consciously r estricted 
       by the authority of the country of refuge that he or she 
       was not in fact resettled. In making his or her 
       determination, the Asylum Officer or Immigration 
       Judge shall consider the conditions under which other 
       residents of the country live, the type of housing made 
       available to the refugee, whether permanent or 
       temporary, the types and extent of employment 
       available to the refugee, and the extent to which the 
       refugee received permission to hold property and to 
       enjoy other rights and privileges, such as travel 
       documentation including a right of entry or r eentry, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. In their briefs, both Abdille and the INS err oneously assume that 8 
C.F.R. S 208.13(c)(2) contains the relevant firm resettlement bar. 
However, by its terms, this provision applies only to an alien "who filed 
his or her application before April 1, 1997." 8 C.F.R. S 208.13(c)(2)(i) 
(2000) (emphasis added). Abdille did not arrive in the United States until 
April 8, 1999, and his asylum application is dated July 23, 1999. 
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       education, public relief, or naturalization, or dinarily 
       available to others resident in the country. 
 
8 C.F.R. S 208.15 (2000) (emphasis added). It is the BIA's 
application of this provision that is at issue. 
 
The BIA's reliance on the firm r esettlement bar as its 
basis for denying Abdille asylum from Somalia r equires us 
to consider the factors that inform a finding of firm 
resettlement. Our analysis, of course, is constrained by the 
great deference we owe to the INS in immigration matters, 
particularly when the agency interprets and applies its own 
regulations. See, e.g., INS v. Aguirr e-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 
424-25 (1999) (holding that Chevron deference, typically 
triggered when an agency construes a statute it is charged 
with administering, is appropriate in the immigration 
context because of the INA's express delegation of authority 
to the Attorney General); Applebaum v. Nissan Motor 
Acceptance Corp., 226 F.3d 214, 218 n.4 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(noting that when an agency is interpreting its own 
regulation, rather than a statute it administers, review is 
under the Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 
410 (1945), standard, which renders the agency's 
interpretation controlling "unless it is plainly erroneous or 
inconsistent with the regulation," id.  at 414). 
 
Our principal guide in this endeavor is the language and 
structure of 8 C.F.R. S 208.15, the INS's own definition of 
firm resettlement. It is readily evident from the plain 
language of S 208.15 that the prime element in the firm 
resettlement inquiry is the existence vel non of "an offer of 
permanent resident status, citizenship, or some other type 
of permanent resettlement." 8 C.F .R. S 208.15 (2000). Thus, 
on its face, S 208.15 explicitly centers thefirm resettlement 
analysis on the question whether a third country issued to 
the alien an offer of some type of official status permitting 
the alien to reside in that country on a per manent basis. 
 
The alternative approach would have us consider the 
existence of a government-issued offer as simply one 
component of a broader firm resettlement inquiry according 
equal weight to such non-offer-based factors as the alien's 
length of stay in a third country, the economic and social 
ties that the alien develops in that country, and the alien's 
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intent to make that country his permanent home. Under 
such an approach, the IJ and BIA would consider both the 
formal issuance of an offer and the existence of various 
non-offer-based factors together , as part of the total mix of 
information bearing on the firm r esettlement question, and, 
after weighing these elements as a whole, would arrive at a 
conclusion regarding the applicant's fir m resettlement in 
the third country. 
 
Such a "totality of the alien's circumstances"-type of 
calculus is suggested by Chinese American Civil Council v. 
Attorney General, 566 F.2d 321 (D.C. Cir. 1977), in which 
the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit found that 
Chinese aliens who had lived in Hong Kong for at least 
fifteen years following their flight from mainland China had 
firmly resettled in Hong Kong. See id. at 326. In reaching 
this conclusion and in elaborating on the fir m resettlement 
inquiry, the D.C. Circuit relied principally on non-offer- 
based elements, noting that the time elapsed between an 
alien's flight from a country of persecution and his 
application for asylum in the U.S. is an important factor in 
determining whether an alien had fir mly resettled in a third 
country, see id. at 328 & n.18, and further stating that 
"[a]n applicant's family ties, intent, business or property 
connections and other matters may be relevant to 
resettlement determinations." Id.  at 328 n.18. The court 
made no mention of whether the government of Hong Kong 
had extended to the aliens an offer of per manent resident 
status, citizenship, or some other type of per manent 
resettlement. 
 
Although not expressly labeling it as such, other courts 
of appeals also appear to have employed a "totality of the 
alien's circumstances" approach in thefirm resettlement 
context. For example, in Farbakhsh v. INS, 20 F.3d 877 (8th 
Cir. 1994), the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
upheld a BIA decision denying an Iranian national eligibility 
for asylum in the United States based on the applicant's 
resettlement in Spain. In concluding that the BIA's finding 
of firm resettlement was supported by the record, the court 
relied on several non-offer-based elements, such as the fact 
that the applicant "had lived more than four years in Spain 
without fear of being returned to Iran"; that "he initially 
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intended to remain in Spain"; and that "his younger brother 
and younger sister were living in Spain." Id. at 882. As in 
Chinese American, no explicit mention of the for mal 
issuance of an offer of permanent r esettlement was made. 
In a similar vein, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit appeared to follow a "totality" approach in Mussie v. 
INS, 172 F.3d 329 (4th Cir. 1999), deciding that an 
Ethiopian citizen had firmly resettled in Germany because 
she received asylum status and travel documentation from 
the German government, and "[i]n addition, she lived in 
Germany for six years, during which time she r eceived 
government assistance for language schooling, 
transportation, rent, and food; held a job; paid taxes; and 
rented her own apartment." Id. at 331-32. 
 
We believe, however, that the plain language of the INS's 
own definition of firm resettlement counsels against such a 
broad, "totality of the alien's circumstances" analytical 
framework. Section 208.15 clearly states that a prima facie 
case of firm resettlement is established once the evidence 
shows that the asylum applicant received "an offer of 
permanent resident status, citizenship, or some other type 
of permanent resettlement" in a thir d country. 8 C.F.R. 
S 208.15 (2000). Although S 208.15 expr essly enumerates 
certain non-offer-based elements, such as "the type of 
housing made available to the refugee, . . . the types and 
extent of employment available to the refugee, and the 
extent to which the refugee received per mission to hold 
property," id. S 208.15(b), it prompts the IJ to consider 
such factors only in determining whether one of the two 
exceptions to the firm resettlement bar provided for in 
S 208.15 applies; it does not list these elements in 
connection with the prima facie showing of fir m resettlement.6 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. For example, S 208.15(a), which per mits an alien to rebut the prima 
facie showing of firm resettlement by demonstrating that "he or she 
remained in that nation only as long as was necessary to arrange 
onward travel," authorizes the alien to set forth evidence that "he or she 
did not establish significant ties in that nation." 8 C.F.R. S 208.15(a) 
(2000) (emphasis added). Similarly, S 208.15(b), which allows an alien to 
make this rebuttal showing by establishing"[t]hat the conditions of his 
or her residence in that nation were . . . substantially and consciously 
restricted by the authority of the country of r efuge," expressly mandates 
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Thus, by its terms, this regulatory pr ovision focuses the 
firm resettlement analysis on the existence vel non of a 
formal government-issued offer . 
 
We are not the first court to r ecognize the prime 
relevance for firm resettlement purposes of a government's 
offer of some type of permanent r esettlement: the Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit followed a complementary 
analysis in Abdalla v. INS, 43 F.3d 1397 (10th Cir. 1994). 
In Abdalla, the court considered the case of a Sudanese 
native who was found by the BIA to have fir mly resettled in 
the United Arab Emirates (UAE) prior to his arrival in the 
United States. See id. at 1398. The court upheld the BIA's 
conclusion, focusing principally on the fact that the alien 
had lived for twenty years in the UAE under a "r esidence 
permit" issued by the UAE government. See id. at 1399. In 
effect, the Abdalla court treated the residence permit, 
which had apparently conferred on the alien a legal right to 
live and work in the UAE for two decades, as dir ect 
evidence of a government-issued offer of permanent 
resettlement. Importantly, the court went on to note that 
this permit, viewed in light of the applicant's twenty-year 
stay in the UAE, "was sufficient to suggest per manent 
resident status, citizenship or some other per manent 
resettlement." Id. at 1399 (inter nal quotation marks and 
citations omitted). The court ended its fir m resettlement 
analysis by shifting the burden to the alien"to prove that 
his extended, officially sanctioned stay in [the UAE] did not 
constitute a firm resettlement in the UAE." Id. at 1399 
(emphasis added). It ultimately concluded that the alien did 
not meet this burden in part because other , non-offer- 
based factors, such as the alien's significant family ties to 
the UAE, militated in favor of a firm r esettlement finding. 
See id. at 1400. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
that an immigration judge, in evaluating the alien's evidentiary 
presentation, consider factors such as "the type of housing made 
available to the refugee, . . . the types and extent of employment 
available to the refugee, and the extent to which the refugee received 
permission to hold property and to enjoy other rights and privileges . . . 
ordinarily available to others resident in the country." 8 C.F.R. 
S 208.15(b) (2000). 
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We acknowledge that circumstances may arise in which 
the INS may not be able to secure direct evidence of a 
formal government offer of some type of permanent 
resettlement, and thus may be not be able to make the 
prima facie showing of firm resettlement under S 208.15 in 
that manner. In such a situation, the IJ or BIA may find it 
necessary to rely on non-offer-based factors, such as the 
length of an alien's stay in a third country, the alien's 
intent to remain in the country, and the extent of the social 
and economic ties developed by the alien, as cir cumstantial 
evidence of the existence of a government-issued offer. As 
we see it, if direct evidence of an offer is unobtainable, such 
non-offer-based elements can serve as a surrogate for 
direct evidence of a formal offer of some type of permanent 
resettlement, if they rise to a sufficient level of clarity and 
force, which we need not here delineate. 7 The Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit faced such a situation in Cheo 
v. INS, 162 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 1998), as described in the 
margin.8 See also Andriasian v. INS, 180 F.3d 1033, 1043 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. In the instant matter, the INS has adduced some direct evidence that 
Abdille received an offer of some type of resettlement from the South 
African government. See infra Section IV.A. The INS also points to 
certain non-offer-based factors, especially Abdille's employment as a 
street vendor and his opportunity to work as an electrician in South 
Africa, to bolster its contention that Abdille hadfirmly resettled in that 
country. See infra note 9. However, because we reject a "totality of the 
alien's circumstances" approach to thefirm resettlement inquiry, and 
because the INS has presented direct evidence of a South African 
government-issued offer (on which it primarily relied in arguing that 
Abdille had received an offer of some type of permanent resettlement 
within the meaning of 8 C.F.R. S 208.15), we need not address whether 
such factors can serve as circumstantial evidence of a government- 
issued offer. 
 
8. In Cheo, two Cambodian nationals, Meng Ly Cheo and Meng Heng 
Cheo, sought refuge from their native land, but had lived for three years 
in Malaysia prior to their entry into the United States. See 162 F.3d at 
1228. In conducting its firm resettlement inquiry, the Ninth Circuit first 
noted that "there is no direct evidence one way or the other as to 
whether the Cheos have or had the right to r eturn to Malaysia," id. at 
1229, and therefore no evidence as to whether they had received an offer 
of permanent resettlement from the government of that country. In such 
a circumstance, the court contemplated the use of non-offer-based 
factors as a substitute for the existence of an of fer as prima facie 
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(9th Cir. 1999) ("In the absence of dir ect evidence of an 
offer, a lengthy, undisturbed r esidence in a third country 
may establish a rebuttable presumption that an individual 
has the right to return to that country and remain there 
permanently."); Mussie v. INS, 172 F.3d 329, 332 (4th Cir. 
1999) (citing with approval Cheo's pr esumption based on 
the length of the alien's stay). 
 
       Finally, we note that the emphasis that S 208.15's firm 
resettlement calculus places on the existence of a formal 
government offer of some type of per manent resettlement is 
in keeping with a principal facet of immigration law: A 
nation has broad authority to regulate the terms and 
conditions under which an individual can be admitted 
within its borders, and under which he can seek to 
establish a residence therein. See Miller v. Albright, 523 
U.S. 420, 453 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring); Rogers v. 
Bellei, 401 U.S. 815, 830-31 (1971). Absent some 
government dispensation, an immigrant who surr eptitiously 
enters a nation without its authorization cannot obtain 
official resident status no matter his length of stay, his 
intent, or the extent of the familial and economic 
connections he develops. Citizenship or permanent 
residency cannot be gained through adverse possession. 
With this understanding of the factors under girding the 
firm resettlement inquiry in mind, we turn to the BIA's 
decision in the instant matter. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
evidence of firm resettlement. Specifically, the court fashioned a 
rebuttable presumption of firm r esettlement based on the aliens' length 
of stay: 
 
       Three years of peaceful residence established that the ground of 
       `firm resettlement' in Malaysia might apply . . . . That was enough 
       time so that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it would 
be 
       a reasonable inference from the duration that Malaysia allowed the 
       Cheos to stay indefinitely. 
 
Id. 
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IV. Abdille's Firm Resettlement in South Africa 
 
A. 
 
It appears that the BIA, in reaching the conclusion that 
the firm resettlement bar precluded the INS from granting 
Abdille asylum from Somalia, relied in part on what it 
considered to be an offer made by the South African 
government to Abdille of some type of per manent 
resettlement. In seeking to make its prima facie showing of 
firm resettlement, the INS intr oduced evidence of two South 
African government documents approving Abdille's 
application for asylum in that country, both contained in 
the Certified Administrative Record. Thefirst record is a 
Certificate of Exemption entitling Abdille to asylum under 
South Africa's Aliens Control Act of 1991 for a two-year 
period of exemption commencing on June 25, 1998 and 
ending on June 24, 2000. The second is a letter fr om South 
Africa's Department of Home Affairs addr essed to Abdille 
discussing Abdille's obligations at the conclusion of this 
two-year refugee period: 
 
       Please note, however, that if at the end of the period of 
       exemption [i.e., June 24, 2000], you do not wish to 
       leave [South Africa], the onus rests on you to contact 
       the Department for the reviewal of your r efugee status 
       or to otherwise legalise your continued stay in[South 
       Africa] before the expiry date of your Certificate. Failure 
       to do so may render you liable to prosecution in terms 
       of the provisions of the Aliens Control Act, 1991 (Act 
       96 of 1991). 
 
Although the BIA acknowledged that the Certificate of 
Exemption conferring refugee status on Abdille would 
expire after a two-year term, it nonetheless concluded that 
the issuance of this certificate repr esented an offer of some 
type of permanent resettlement within the meaning of 8 
C.F.R. S 208.15's firm r esettlement definition because, 
according to the BIA's reading of the Department of Home 
Affairs letter, Abdille's refugee status "does not simply 
terminate" at the end of the two-year exemption period. 
Looking at those two documents, the BIA deter mined that 
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the firm resettlement bar applied to Abdille, requiring the 
INS to deny Abdille's asylum application.9  
 
We cannot say, however, that the two documents 
describing Abdille's refugee status under South African law 
constitute substantial evidence supporting the conclusion 
that the government of South Africa granted Abdille an offer 
of some other type of permanent resettlement. If anything, 
these records compel the contrary conclusion--i.e., that 
such an offer of resettlement was, by its terms, only 
temporary in nature. As is evident from the face of the 
Certificate of Exemption, South Africa's of fer to Abdille of 
asylum status (and Abdille's acceptance of that of fer) 
carried with it an explicit termination date: Abdille's legal 
right to reside in South Africa as a refugee exempt from 
certain provisions of the Aliens Control Act of 1991 would 
end on June 24, 2000. Furthermore, the Department of 
Home Affairs letter to Abdille makes clear that, absent 
further action on Abdille's part, he would be subject to 
prosecution under South African law should he choose to 
remain in South Africa after the expiration of the two-year 
exemption period on June 24, 2000. Given this plain 
language, we are hard-pressed to see how these documents 
lend support to the BIA's conclusion that Abdille's refugee 
status "does not simply terminate" on June 24, 2000, and 
was in fact of a more permanent natur e. 
 
We acknowledge, however, that we lack familiarity with 
the intricacies of South African immigration law. While the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The BIA's opinion mentions other non-of fer-based factors such as the 
fact that Abdille was issued a travel document granting him the right to 
re-enter South Africa after trips abroad; had the opportunity and ability 
to rent a private home in Cape Town; and had the opportunity to work 
as an electrician if certified. However, fr om the language of the BIA's 
decision, it does not appear that the BIA employed these factors in 
connection with its determination that Abdille had received an offer of 
some other type of permanent resettlement from South Africa. Rather, 
the BIA's opinion demonstrates that it employed these factors to 
conclude that South Africa did not substantially and consciously restrict 
the conditions of Abdille's residence, and thus to reject Abdille's 
attempt 
to rely on the firm resettlement exception contained in S 208.15(b). On 
appeal, Abdille does not challenge the BIA's finding with regard to that 
exception. 
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information contained in the Certificate of Exemption and 
the Department of Home Affairs letter to Abdille strongly 
suggests that the grant of refugee status for afixed term of 
two years is something short of an offer of some other type 
of permanent resettlement, it may be true that under the 
relevant provisions of South African immigration law, or the 
application of that law in practice, a refugee's two-year 
exemption period will often mature into a mor e permanent 
status. For instance, it may be that provisions of the Aliens 
Control Act ease the burden on an alien applying for official 
permanent resident status if that alien has already received 
asylum, or that, as a matter of immigration practice, two- 
year refugees like Abdille routinely r eceive a form of 
permanent status if they apply for such status prior to the 
expiration of the two-year exemption period. The Certified 
Administrative Record is completely silent on these points, 
however, and at this stage, in the absence of further 
evidence, reliance on these contingencies would amount to 
nothing more than mere speculation. 
 
The BIA's decision in Matter of D-L- & A-M-, 20 I. & N. 
Dec. 409 (BIA 1991), is instructive in this r egard. In D-L- & 
A-M-, the BIA found that two Cuban natives seeking asylum 
from that country had firmly resettled in Spain, where they 
had spent six years prior to their entry into the United 
States. See id. at 414. In reaching this conclusion, the 
Board appropriately focused on the Spanish government's 
official recognition of the aliens' legal right to reside in that 
country. Specifically, the BIA noted that the aliens had 
received official temporary resident status that was 
renewable each year, and, importantly, that this temporary 
residency could be converted to permanent residency once 
one of the aliens obtained a work contract. See id. at 411, 
414. This latter point was established through the cross- 
examination testimony of one of the aliens in hearings 
before the INS. See id. at 411. In the instant matter, the 
proceedings on remand may very well yield similar evidence 
of the likelihood that Abdille's fixed, two-year r efugee term 
in South Africa will be converted into a mor e permanent 
status. 
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B. 
 
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, pr oper 
resolution of the firm resettlement issue requires further 
information as to the content of South African immigration 
law and practice. Given the limited nature of the record 
before us on appeal, and the considerable defer ence we owe 
to the INS in immigration matters, we believe it improper 
for us to settle the firm resettlement question based on our 
hypotheses regarding the type of contingencies that could 
have occurred at the end of Abdille's two-year exemption 
period under the terms of the Aliens Contr ol Act or its 
practical applications.10 Accor dingly, we consider it 
necessary to grant Abdille's Petition for Review and to 
remand, so that the BIA may further investigate the content 
of South African immigration law and practice in general, 
and may resolve the specific question whether , under South 
African refugee law and practice, the issuance of a 
Certificate of Exemption granting an alien r efugee status for 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Moreover, we do not believe that the circumstances are appropriate 
for us to take judicial notice of the content of South African law on this 
appeal. In general, foreign law is treated as a fact that must be proven 
by the parties. See, e.g., Black Diamond Steamship Corp. v. Robert 
Stewart & Sons, 336 U.S. 386, 397 (1949) ("[T]he Court has adhered to 
the general principle that foreign law is to be proved as a fact."); 
Intercontinental Trading Co., Inc. v. M/V Zenit Sun, 684 F. Supp. 861, 
864 (E.D. Pa. 1988) ("No proof having been presented at trial as to 
Chilean law, the court cannot take judicial notice of the law of Chile 
. . . ."). Although federal courts have discr etionary authority to 
judicially 
notice the laws of foreign countries pursuant to the fact-finding 
procedure contained in Fed. R. Civ. Pr o. 44.1, see 1 Jack B. Weinstein 
& Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Federal Evidence S 201.52[3][b], at 
201-94 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2000); see also Sidali v. INS, 
107 F.3d 191, 197 n.9 (3d Cir. 1997), because such a procedure was not 
followed in the instant matter, we will r efrain from judicially noticing 
the 
content of South African refugee law. 
 
We did conduct a preliminary investigation into South African law, to 
see whether an issue existed with respect to the consequences that 
Abdille would experience under South African immigration law and 
practice upon the expiration of his two-year r efugee period. The 
information we obtained suggested that such an issue did exist, and we 
therefore concluded that remand to the BIA was the appropriate avenue 
for resolution of that issue. We did not use the information we gathered 
except in this preliminary fashion, and, as noted above, we decline to 
judicially notice it. 
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a fixed two-year term amounted to an of fer of some other 
type of permanent resettlement within the meaning of 
S 208.15. On remand, both Abdille and the INS should be 
afforded an opportunity to supplement the record by 
presenting evidence bearing on these issues. Of course, we 
express no opinion as to the proper r esolution of the 
question whether Abdille had firmly r esettled in South 
Africa.11 
 
V. The Burden of Proof as to the Content of 
South African Law 
 
Because the substance of South African immigration law 
will prove highly relevant to the final disposition of the firm 
resettlement issue, and in the interest of providing some 
further guidance on remand, we need to consider the issue 
of which party--Abdille or the government--will bear the 
burden of establishing the content of South African law on 
remand. We note in this regar d that in our discussion 
above, we implicitly addressed part of this bur den 
allocation issue when we referenced the government's 
burden to make the prima facie showing of fir m 
resettlement. We now make this discussion explicit. 
 
Although this precise issue was not addr essed by the 
BIA's decision in Abdille's matter, a long line of BIA case 
law establishes that "[f]oreign law is a matter to be proven 
by the party seeking to rely on it." Matter of Soleimani, 20 
I. & N. Dec. 99, 106 (BIA 1989). Ordinarily, it is the asylum 
applicant who seeks the benefit of foreign law, and thus 
carries the burden of demonstrating its content. See, e.g., 
Sadeghi v. INS, 40 F.3d 1139, 1143 (10th Cir. 1994) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. On appeal, Abdille argues in the alter native that the BIA's finding 
of 
firm resettlement in South Africa was erroneous because Abdille fell 
within one of the two exceptions to the fir m resettlement bar contained 
in 8 C.F.R. S 208.15--i.e., he established "[t]hat his or her entry into 
that 
nation was a necessary consequence of his or herflight from 
persecution, that he or she remained in that nation only as long as was 
necessary to arrange onward travel, and that he or she did not establish 
significant ties in that nation." 8 C.F .R. S 208.15(a) (2000). Because we 
remand to the BIA for further proceedings in connection with the firm 
resettlement issue, we will not address the merits of Abdille's 
contention. 
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("Placing the burden of proving for eign law on a petitioner 
is consistent with the general rule that the petitioner bears 
the burden of proof "); Matter of Annang, 14 I. & N. Dec. 
502, 503 (BIA 1973) ("[T]he law of a for eign country is a 
question of fact which must be proved by the petitioner if 
he relies on it to establish eligibility for an immigration 
benefit."). 
 
The BIA, however, has had occasion to apply this rule in 
order to place burdens on the gover nment. In Soleimani, 
the immigration judge found that an Iranian Jew hadfirmly 
resettled in Israel, relying principally on the assumption 
that, because Israel's Law of Return granted all members of 
the Jewish faith the right to Israeli citizenship, it was 
probable that the alien had received an of fer of resident 
status, citizenship, or some other type of per manent 
resettlement from the Israeli gover nment. See 20 I. & N. 
Dec. at 102. Observing that the record contained no 
evidence "documenting the nature and purpose of Israel's 
Law of Return or the specific provisions of that law," the 
BIA reversed the immigration judge's finding on the ground 
that "[f]oreign law is a matter to be pr oven by the party 
seeking to rely on it, and the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service has submitted nothing of r ecord 
regarding Israel's Law of Return." Id. at 106. 
 
The rule that foreign law is a matter to be pr oven by the 
party seeking to rely on it must, at all events, be read in 
conjunction with the INS regulations establishing the 
general burden of proof allocation with r espect to the firm 
resettlement issue. The pertinent regulatory provision is 8 
C.F.R. S 208.13(c)(2)(ii), which states the following: "If the 
evidence indicates that one of the above gr ounds [including 
the firm resettlement bar] apply to the applicant, he or she 
shall have the burden of proving by a pr eponderance of the 
evidence that he or she did not so act." 8 C.F .R. 
S 208.13(c)(2)(ii) (2000) (emphasis added). 12 The burden 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. As a formal matter, we note that, by its terms, the burden scheme 
contemplated in 8 C.F.R. S 208(c)(2)(ii) applies only to firm resettlement 
bar contained in 8 C.F.R. S 208(c)(2)(i)(B), which itself applies only to 
asylum applications filed before April 1, 1997. Abdille's application was 
filed after April 1, 1997, and thus the fir m resettlement bar applicable 
to 
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allocation regarding firm r esettlement is thus evident from 
the language of S 208.13(c)(2)(ii). Under the regulations, the 
INS bears the initial burden of producing evidence that 
indicates that the firm resettlement bar applies, and, 
should the INS satisfy this threshold bur den of production, 
both the burden of production and the risk of non- 
persuasion then shift to the applicant to demonstrate, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that he or she had not 
firmly resettled in another country. See, e.g., Mussie v. INS, 
172 F.3d 329, 332 (4th Cir. 1999) (applying the 
S 208.13(c)(2)(ii) burden framework, and noting that "[o]nce 
the INS met its burden of introducing some evidence 
indicating that [the applicant] had been `firmly resettled' in 
Germany, [the applicant] bore the burden of demonstrating, 
by a preponderance of the evidence, that she had not been 
resettled"); see also Abdalla v. INS, 43 F.3d 1397, 1399 
(10th Cir. 1994) ("Once the government presents some 
evidence indicating that asylum is unavailable on gr ounds 
of firm resettlement . . . the petitioner bears the burden of 
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that such 
grounds do not apply.") (citations and inter nal quotation 
marks omitted); Chinese American Civil Council v. Attorney 
General, 566 F.2d 321, 328 n.18 (D.C. Cir . 1977) 
("Resettlement is largely a factual question which, once that 
fact appears of record, the applicants bear the burden of 
overcoming."). 
 
We conclude that the burden allocation scheme 
established by the applicable INS regulations is controlling. 
Both the INS and Abdille may, at differ ent points in the 
immigration proceeding, constitute parties seeking to rely 
on foreign law and, under the regime cr eated by the 
regulations, both may consequently bear the bur den of 
producing evidence of the substance of South African 
immigration law and practice. Specifically, the INS will 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
his case is found not in the INS regulations, but rather in the federal 
asylum statute, at 8 U.S.C. S 1158(b)(2)(A)(vi). See supra note 4 and 
accompanying text. Nonetheless, we find no r eason to believe that 
Congress, by codifying the firm r esettlement bar, intended to alter the 
burden scheme contained in 8 C.F.R.S 208.13(c)(2)(ii) and, accordingly, 
will apply that scheme to Abdille's case. 
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clearly carry the initial burden of setting forth evidence that 
"indicates" that Abdille had firmly r esettled in South Africa, 
and, to the extent that the INS relies on pr ovisions of South 
African law--e.g. asylum provisions found in the Aliens 
Control Act--to demonstrate that the South African 
government granted Abdille "an offer of permanent resident 
status, citizenship, or some other type of per manent 
resettlement" within the meaning of 8 C.F .R. S 208.15's firm 
resettlement definition, it will thus carry the burden of 
setting forth evidence of the substance of that law. 
 
Should the INS meet this threshold burden of production, 
however, the burden of introducing evidence to overcome 
the firm resettlement finding would shift to Abdille, the 
asylum applicant. If Abdille then seeks to use the 
substance of South African law to rebut thefirm 
resettlement finding--e.g., by pointing to particular 
provisions of the Aliens Control Act thatfix the term of 
refugee status to two years in order to r ebut the suggestion 
that he was issued an offer of permanent resettlement-- 
Abdille will carry the burden of setting forth the relevant 
content of South African immigration law and practice. 
Moreover, as contemplated in S 208.13(c)(2)(ii)'s allocation 
scheme, once the government carries its bur den of 
production by setting forth evidence that "indicates" that 
firm resettlement has occurred, Abdille also bears the 
ultimate burden of persuasion. That is, insofar as Abdille 
relies on provisions of South African law to defeat the firm 
resettlement bar, he must prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that those provisions render thefirm resettlement 
bar inapplicable to his case. 
 
VI. Asylum from South Africa 
 
The BIA rejected Abdille's request for asylum from South 
Africa based on the attacks and the alleged harassment he 
experienced during his ten months in that country. As 
discussed supra in Part II, to be eligible for asylum in the 
United States as a refugee, an alien must demonstrate 
"persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on 
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group, or political opinion." 8 U.S.C. 
S 1101(a)(42)(A). The BIA agreed with the IJ that Abdille had 
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failed to carry his burden with respect to establishing either 
past persecution or a well-founded fear of futur e 
persecution. Because this issue was squarely pr esented in 
Abdille's Petition for Review and was fully ar gued, and 
because the question whether Abdille experienced 
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution is 
independent of the question whether Abdille wasfirmly 
resettled in that country, we do not believe that remand of 
this issue to the BIA is warranted. We ther efore proceed to 
the merits. In light of the deference we owe to the BIA's 
factual findings under the standard of r eview established in 
INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992), and for the 
reasons that follow, we cannot say that the r ecord evidence 
compels a conclusion contrary to the BIA's and, 
accordingly, we decide that the BIA's decision with respect 
to Abdille's request for asylum from South Africa must 
stand. 
 
A. 
 
Abdille first argues that the BIA's deter mination that 
Abdille had not established past persecution was not 
supported by the record evidence. Under 8 C.F.R. 
S 208.13(b)(1) (2000), 
 
       [a]n applicant shall be found to be a r efugee on the 
       basis of past persecution if he or she can establish that 
       he or she has suffered persecution in the past in his or 
       her country of . . . last habitual residence on account 
       of race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
       particular social group, or political opinion, and that he 
       or she is unable or unwilling to return to or avail 
       himself or herself of the protection of that country 
       owing to such persecution. 
 
Abdille's claim of persecution in South Africa does not arise 
out of any official action or policy instituted by the South 
African government. Rather, Abdille alleges persecution at 
the hands of private groups of attackers that the South 
African government was either unable or unwilling to 
control. See Singh v. INS, 94 F .3d 1353, 1360 (9th Cir. 
1996) ("Persecution meted out by groups that the 
government is unable or unwilling to contr ol constitutes 
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persecution under the [Immigration and Nationality] Act. 
Non-governmental groups need not file articles of 
incorporation before they can be capable of persecution.") 
(citation omitted). 
 
To establish past persecution, Abdille set forth evidence 
establishing that he had suffered individualized attacks, 
coupled with documentary evidence attempting to link his 
personal experiences of harassment and violence with the 
experiences of other similarly situated Somali and African 
refugees living in South Africa. Abdille's individualized 
evidence, primarily testimonial in nature, demonstrated 
that Abdille had suffered two separate attacks while 
working as a street vendor in public marketplaces in Cape 
Town. The first occurred in July 1998, when a group of five 
or six South Africans assaulted Abdille, knocking him 
unconscious and stealing his merchandise. Abdille went to 
the police station to make a report concer ning the incident, 
but the officers told him to return at a later time.13 The 
second attack took place five months later , when a different 
group attacked Abdille in a separate market. Abdille fled 
before he could be injured, but the gr oup did steal all of his 
goods. 
 
Abdille's documentary evidence, consisting of r eports on 
South Africa issued by human rights groups and 
newspaper stories printed in South African newspapers, 
described in general the xenophobic attitudes taken by 
South African citizens and politicians towar d African 
immigrants, and specifically identified instances of violent 
acts committed against foreigners, including foreign street 
vendors working in cities such as Cape Town. Among the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. The Certified Administrative Record is unclear as to whether Abdille 
did in fact return to the police station to prosecute his claim. In 
proceedings before the IJ, Abdille testified on direct examination that 
after he reported the July 1998 attack to the police, "they told me every 
day come back, come back and they haven't did anything for me," 
suggesting that Abdille did make subsequent visits that were ultimately 
unavailing. On the other hand, while being cr oss-examined by the INS 
concerning this first police report, Abdille appeared to concede that he 
did not in fact return to the station:"I never went back that day but are 
there [sic] more than 10 times they say come back and they didn't do 
anything for me." 
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most pertinent such documents contained in the Certified 
Administrative Record are: (1) a Mar ch 1998 report issued 
by Human Rights Watch; (2) a December 1998 r eport put 
forth by the South African Human Rights Commission; and 
(3) two stories from the August 6, 1998 issue of Cape 
Times, a Cape Town newspaper. The Human Rights Watch 
and South African Human Rights Commission reports 
document harassment of street vendors similar to that 
experienced by Abdille.14 
 
The BIA, after noting that Abdille had "intr oduced 
evidence of criminal behavior by private individuals in 
South Africa and disturbing documentary evidence of 
xenophobia in South Africa," concluded that Abdille had 
failed to sufficiently establish past persecution on account 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. The Human Rights Watch report, titled "Prohibited Persons: Abuse of 
Undocumented Migrants, Asylum-Seekers, and Refugees in South 
Africa," contains the following passage: 
 
       Foreign hawkers, often asylum applicants with temporary residence 
       permits, have repeatedly been the tar gets of violent protests and 
       other forms of intimidation as local hawkers attempt to "clean the 
       streets of foreigners." During r epeated violent protests in 
       Johannesburg, South African traders and or dinary criminals have 
       brutally beaten foreign hawkers, and stolen their goods. Hawkers 
       interviewed by Human Rights Watch who wer e the targets of such 
       abuse universally complained to us that the police had done little 
or 
       nothing in response to their complaints. . . . Human Rights Watch 
       interviewed members of a large community of Somali asylum- 
       seekers who had been forced to abandon their trade and who told 
       Human Rights Watch that they now never left their overcrowded and 
       impoverished compound unless they were in a lar ge group, in order 
       to protect themselves from attacks by hostile "locals." 
 
A similar account of violence against foreign street vendors appears in 
the South African Human Rights Commission's r eport, titled "1999 Plan 
of Action: Roll Back Xenophobia Campaign": 
 
       Vigilante groups have vowed to clear for eign traders off the 
streets 
       of Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth and Cape T own. They inflame 
       public opinion with the perception that for eign traders take away 
       jobs from locals by unfairly competing for customers, space and 
       markets. As part of ongoing, hostile campaigns, mobs are raiding 
       foreign hawkers, often causing bodily har m, vandalising their 
stalls 
       and stealing their goods. 
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of one of the five protected factors listed in the statutory 
definition of refugee, because he could not demonstrate 
that the violence he suffered was perpetrated by persons 
that the government was unwilling or unable to control. To 
buttress this conclusion, the BIA pointed to the fact that 
there was no evidence that Abdille was harassed or 
disturbed in Johannesburg during his thr ee-week stay 
there; that the two attacks Abdille experienced were 
committed by two separate groups of people; that Abdille 
could not identify his assailants; and that after r eporting 
the attacks to the police, Abdille failed to pr osecute these 
charges by returning to the station, as requested by the 
police.15 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. The BIA does not appear entirely corr ect with respect to the latter 
two points. The BIA's claim that Abdille could not identify his assailants 
is partially undermined by Abdille's testimony before the IJ concerning 
his response to the first attack in July 1998: "When I went down [to] the 
police station, . . . I told them I even know the people who attack me 
because some of them they collect the money in the bus station where 
I sell my merchandise." The INS concedes that Abdille could identify the 
perpetrators of this first assault. The recor d appears silent on the 
issue 
of whether Abdille could identify the December 1998 attackers. 
 
With respect to the BIA's assertion that Abdille failed to return to the 
police station following his reports of the attack, as directed, the 
record 
is not as clear as the BIA appears to assume. As mentioned supra in 
note 13, the evidence is ambiguous as to whether Abdille visited the 
police station after reporting the first attack. With regard to the second 
assault, Abdille testified that he reported the incident to the police, 
and 
"[t]hey said they make appointment and they told me come back 
tomorrow." The record is silent as to whether Abdille returned the next 
day as instructed. 
 
Although the BIA's characterization of the r ecord evidence may not 
have fully accomodated these ambiguities in the r ecord, such error does 
not ultimately affect our decision to uphold the BIA's denial of Abdille's 
request for asylum from South Africa. For the reasons stated in the text 
above, the evidence Abdille did introduce to establish past persecution 
and a well-founded fear of persecution simply does not compel a 
conclusion contrary to the BIA's, even if we discount the evidence 
supporting the BIA's determination so as to take account of its failure to 
recognize either the fact that Abdille could identify the perpetrators of 
the first assault, or that Abdille may have made some effort to follow up 
on his report of the first incident to the police. 
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To be sure, the record evidence put forth by Abdille is 
consistent with his theory of persecution. Abdille's 
testimony demonstrates that he experienced individualized 
harassment, and the documentary evidence rescribed in the 
margin, supra at note 14, tends to show that these attacks 
could have been the product of a more generalized animus 
among segments of the South African public dir ected at 
foreign asylum seekers, particularly those r efugees working 
as street vendors in cities like Cape T own. Furthermore, 
Abdille's testimony concerning the police's lackadaisical 
responses to his reports is in accor d with descriptions 
found in the human rights reports introduced by Abdille of 
police inaction in the face of private violence against foreign 
street vendors. 
 
However, the evidence put forth by Abdille is also 
consistent with acts of private violence that fall short of 
persecution on account of race, nationality, or membership 
in a particular social group. The assaults experienced by 
Abdille at the hands of two different sets of assailants could 
represent random street violence, motivated not by 
animosity against a particular ethnic group, but rather by 
arbitrary hostility or by a desire to r eap financial rewards. 
Such ordinary criminal activity does not rise to the level of 
persecution necessary to establish eligibility for asylum. 
See, e.g., Singh v. INS, 134 F.3d 962, 967 (9th Cir. 1998) 
("Mere generalized lawlessness and violence between diverse 
populations, of the sort which abounds in numer ous 
countries and inflicts misery upon millions of innocent 
people daily around the world, generally is not sufficient to 
permit the Attorney General to grant asylum . . . ."); 
Sangha v. INS, 103 F.3d 1482, 1487 (9th Cir. 1997) 
("[P]ersecution on account of political opinion no longer can 
be inferred merely from acts of random violence . . . ."). It 
is also important to note that Abdille was not har med in 
South Africa except when he was engaged in vending 
activities in public marketplaces. 
 
In an attempt to establish that he was the victim of 
persecution, and not just the target of or dinary street 
violence, Abdille asserts that his situation is identical to the 
one found in the BIA's recent decision in In re O-Z- & I-Z-, 
Int. Dec. No. 3346, 1998 WL 177674 (BIA Apr. 2, 1998), in 
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which the BIA concluded that acts of harassment 
committed by the "Rukh," a pro Ukranian independence 
group, against a Jewish Ukrainian citizen who advocated 
unification with Russia, rose to the level of persecution. 
What Abdille fails to explain, however, is that the record 
evidence in O-Z- & I-Z- made readily apparent the fact that 
the "Rukh" assailants were motivated by a desire to 
penalize the victim's religion. For example, the evidence 
showed that anti-Semitic leaflets distributed by the "Rukh" 
were left in the victim's clothing and at his home; that the 
victim suffered two assaults resulting in physical injuries 
while on his way home from work and at a bus stop near 
his home, during which anti-Semitic remarks wer e directed 
at him; and that the victim's son suffer ed physical and 
verbal abuse at school as a result of his Jewish 
background. In contrast to the direct pr oof of ubiquitous 
religion-based animus presented by the asylum applicant in 
O-Z- & L-Z-, in the proceedings befor e the IJ, Abdille offered 
no such comparable evidence, relying instead on 
descriptions of a generalized climate of hostility in South 
Africa toward African refugees and for eign street vendors 
found in human rights groups' reports and newspaper 
articles. 
 
Aside from such documentary evidence, Abdille furnished 
no evidence demonstrating that the two attacks he 
experienced in July and December of 1998 wer e not mere 
acts of random lawlessness, but rather were perpetrated on 
account of his race, nationality, or membership in a 
particular social group. Such tenuous evidence may 
support an inference that the assaults Abdille suffered rose 
to the level of persecution, but it does not compel such a 
conclusion. Accordingly, given our defer ential review, the 
BIA's decision as to past persecution must stand. 
 
B. 
 
Abdille also avers that the BIA's determination that 
Abdille failed to establish a well-founded fear of persecution 
was not supported by record evidence. Under 8 C.F.R. 
S 208.13(b)(2) (2000), 
 
       [a]n applicant shall be found to have a well-founded 
       fear of persecution if he or she can establish first, that 
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       he or she has a fear of persecution in his or her 
       country of . . . last habitual residence on account of 
       race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular 
       social group, or political opinion; second, that there is 
       a reasonable possibility of suffering such persecution if 
       he or she were to return to that country; and third, 
       that he or she is unable or unwilling to retur n to or 
       avail himself or herself of the protection of that country 
       because of such fear. 
 
Establishing a well-founded fear of persecution does not 
require the alien to demonstrate that persecution is more 
likely than not to occur; rather, fear of persecution "can be 
well-founded even `when there is a less than 50% chance of 
the occurrence taking place.' " Chang v. INS, 119 F.3d 
1055, 1066 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting INS v. Cardozo-Fonseca, 
480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987)). 
 
Furthermore, the demonstration of a well-founded fear of 
persecution carries both a subjective and an objective 
component. The alien must "show that he has a subjective 
fear of persecution that is supported by objective evidence 
that persecution is a reasonable possibility." Id. There is no 
question that Abdille's fear of future persecution in the 
event of a return to South Africa is subjectively genuine; 
the only issue is whether that subjective state of mind is 
buttressed by objective evidence that a r easonable person 
in Abdille's circumstances would also fear persecution. 
 
In reaching its conclusion that Abdille had not 
established a well-founded fear of future persecution, the 
BIA relied primarily on the fact that Abdille had failed to 
establish that his fear of persecution exists country-wide, 
and is not confined solely to the Cape Town area. The 
requirement of demonstrating a country-wide fear of 
persecution is evident from the BIA's r ecent decision in In 
re C-A-L-, Int. Dec. No. 3305, 1997 WL 80985 (BIA Feb. 21, 
1997), in which a Guatemalan citizen and for mer soldier 
who had participated in missions against the guerrillas 
operating in that country sought asylum from Guatemala, 
claiming that he feared that guerrilla gr oups would 
persecute him due to his past military service against them. 
The BIA rejected the applicant's asylum claim, on the 
ground that documentary evidence demonstrated that 
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guerrilla activity in Guatemala was localized in particular 
regions of the country; that the evidence of guerilla activity 
specifically targeting the soldier showed that such activity 
was confined to the soldier's hometown; and that the 
applicant had acknowledged that he had been able to move 
to and live in other regions of Guatemala without incident. 
Stating that "an alien seeking to meet the definition of a 
refugee must do more than show a well-founded fear of 
persecution in a particular place within a country," the BIA 
concluded that the applicant's "asylum claim must. . . be 
denied because he has not provided any convincing 
evidence to suggest that his fear of persecution would exist 
throughout Guatemala." 
 
Further, in Etugh v. INS, 921 F .2d 36 (3d Cir. 1990), we 
employed an almost identical analysis in a case involving a 
Nigerian citizen seeking asylum from his native country. 
The applicant claimed that he feared persecution upon 
return to Nigeria, due to factional fighting between 
residents of his hometown Akirika and townspeople in the 
nearly village of Abala. See id. at 37. The BIA had 
concluded that the applicant had failed to make the 
requisite prima facie showing of a well-founded fear, in part 
because he had not established that his safety would be 
threatened in parts of Nigeria outside of Akirika. We agreed, 
stating that the applicant "failed to allege[that] he would be 
persecuted beyond the local vicinity of his hometown, 
Akirika" and that "deportation would not r equire [the 
applicant] to return to the purportedly dangerous region of 
Nigeria where he formerly lived." Id. at 39. 
 
Abdille claims that the record evidence supports a fear of 
persecution throughout South Africa. Having examined the 
exhibits in the Certified Administrative Recor d, we cannot 
agree. By and large, the majority of Abdille's evidence--and 
certainly the most probative items--focused on harassment 
and violence only in the Cape Town region of South Africa, 
which contains but a small part of the country's 
population. Acts of past persecution suffer ed by an alien 
are often the best objective evidence supporting the 
applicant's fear of future persecution, cf.  208.13(b)(1)(i) ("If 
it is determined that the applicant has established past 
persecution, he or she shall be presumed also to have a 
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well-founded fear of persecution . . . ."), but the 
individualized acts of persecution Abdille claims to have 
experienced occurred only in Cape Town, and only at times 
Abdille was working as a street vendor selling goods in 
public marketplaces. 
 
Moreover, as suggested above, the r ecord contains no 
evidence indicating that after Abdille moved to 
Johannesburg in January 1999, his three-week stay there 
was disturbed, and, more importantly, Abdille admitted 
that he never attempted to live in any region of South Africa 
other than Cape Town and Johannesburg. Finally, the most 
pertinent pieces of documentary evidence--i.e., those 
reports relating attacks on foreign street vendors, rescribed 
supra in note 14--describe such assaults as occurring in 
areas around the cities of Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, and 
Johannesburg; they do not mention whether similar anti- 
foreigner campaigns exist in other regions of South Africa. 
Under Elias-Zacarias's deferential standard, we cannot say 
that such evidence compels a conclusion contrary to the 
BIA's determination that Abdille failed to establish a well- 
founded fear of persecution. Accordingly, the BIA's decision 
as to Abdille's well-founded fear must stand. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
 
We conclude that the BIA's consideration of the question 
whether Abdille received an offer of some type of permanent 
resettlement from the South African gover nment was 
incomplete. We will therefore grant Abdille's Petition for 
Review, and remand to the BIA for investigation into the 
content of South African immigration law and practice, for 
resolution of the question whether Abdille r eceived an offer 
of some type of permanent resettlement, and for such 
further proceedings as are necessary to determine Abdille's 
immigration status. However, we also conclude that the BIA 
did not err in denying Abdille asylum from South Africa on 
the ground that he failed to make the r equisite showing of 
past persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution, and 
deny the Petition for Review to that extent. 
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